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Released Sept. 17, 2002, twenty month after President shrub took office, the 33-page national Security Strategy (NSS) offers the administration"s very first comprehensive rationale for a new, aggressive approach to nationwide security. The new strategy calls for preemptive activity against enemy states and terror groups. It says that the U.S. "will no hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively." The NSS likewise focuses on how diplomacy and also foreign assist can and should be offered to task American values, consisting of "a fight for the future that the Muslim world." right here are the see of chronicler John Lewis Gaddis the Yale; defense policy professional Kenneth Pollack; mark Danner that The brand-new Yorker; wilhelm Kristol the The Weekly Standard; and also Karen DeYoung and Barton Gellman that The Washington write-up on the significance of this document.

You are watching: The bush doctrine is a foreign policy strategy that incorporates

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Professor of political Science, Yale University

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I think the declare is a cool strategy in several various senses. Very first of all, that responds come a crisis. And it is situations that generally generate grand strategies. So, just as the grand strategy that won human being War II come out of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack, for this reason this one did together well. This is no surprising that there would be a inventory of cool strategic presumptions in the wake of something choose the 9/11 attack.

Secondly, ns think it"s a grand strategy in the feeling that it is comprehensive. The does not just break increase the people into regions and say that we have method for this region, method for the region, yet these don"t necessarily interconnect. I think that was often the tendency in the Clinton administration, a bunch of components that walk not completely add to a whole. And also I think that this strategy does, in that sense.

I think it"s additionally a grand strategy in the sense that it has both short-term and also long-term objectives. This cool strategy is in reality looking towards the culmination the the Wilsonian task of a world safe because that democracy, even in the center East. And this long-term dimension of it, it appears to me, goes beyond what we"ve watched in the reasoning of more recent administrations. It is much more characteristic the the kind of thinking, say, the the Truman administration was doing at the beginning of the Cold battle -- thinking not only about what perform we have to do tomorrow, and what perform we have to do following week, yet where execute we desire to come out at the end of this process. So, that"s why ns think it qualifies together a cool strategy.

And how is it an historic shift?

The shrub strategy is an historic shift for American international policy since it yes, really is the very first serious American grand strategy because containment in the at an early stage days of the Cold War. We went v the Cold War, the Cold war ended, and also we obtained into a new situation there is no a grand strategy. We didn"t really devise a cool strategy in the beforehand "90s in the immediate results of the Cold War. And also that"s not terribly surprising. We didn"t carry out that either in the immediate results of people War I. We went v the whole 1920s and even the 1930s without a meaningful grand strategy. However the shock the Pearl Harbor required us come devise one. And also the shock the 9/11 did something prefer that together well.

And I would argue that the shrub grand strategy is the most fundamental reshaping that American cool strategy that we"ve seen due to the fact that containment, which to be articulated back in 1947.

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Staff Writer, The brand-new Yorker

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When you look at the administration"s policy -- particularly the much-ballyhooed national Security -- i beg your pardon talks around preemption, the need of maintaining preponderant power, every one of these very vivid phrases -- i think it"s important to evaluate not only what is brand-new about that, yet what is old. What is old is the notion of the United states as an exceptional power, as the one an excellent power ~ above the scene, the need to divide the world into the joined States and the great forces, and the remainder of the world, which is seen as evil.

This is one administration, which, in some sense, shows good pessimism around the world, a an excellent sense that the people is threatening this country. In the sense, 9/11 came as miscellaneous of a godsend. Definitely they didn"t welcome it. But in an ideological sense, this idea of threat, the necessity to prepare for continuous threat, the idea of removed threats before they can strike us and, over all, this idea the unilateral strong action, that the most an effective must execute all it have the right to to avoid any kind of strictures on its power -- this were elements that preexisted 9/11.

9/11 enabled them to come right into force, to come out and also take a publicly role, in a method they never could have otherwise. It"s crucial to see those, ns think, as something not entirely brand-new at all. Indeed, those tendencies have a really obvious background in American international policy that dates from the Truman Doctrine, and that also dates from the supporters of rollback in the early 1950s, human being who assumed that the idea of containing communism was profoundly un-American. "We shouldn"t be contents to let communist exist and wait till it crumbles." -- which to be George Kennan"s idea -- "We need to go out and destroy communism, role it back."

These were people like Gen. MacArthur, that tried to execute that in the korean Peninsula, and also others, who promoted supporting the Hungarian revolution, because that example, in 1956. They believed that the U.S. Has to take one active duty in pushing freedom forward, and also even act it through the end of bayonets, through military force.

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RELATED LINKS

National protection Strategy that the united StatesReleased top top Sept. 17, 2002, the bush administration"s an initial formal explain of its nationwide security strategy presents a bold and considerable reformulation of U.S. Foreign policy.

A grand Strategy the TransformationThe shrub administration"s nationwide Security Strategy, writes chronicler John Lewis Gaddis, "comes across as more forceful, an ext carefully crafted and also -- unexpectedly -- an ext multilateral 보다 its instant predecessor."

The Next civilization OrderThe brand-new Yorker"s Nicholas Lemann examines the roots of the preemption policy and also how Sept. 11 served as "a transformative moment" for part members the George W. Bush"s international policy team.

George shrub & the WorldFrances FitzGerald critiques the shrub administration"s international policy, citing that break v "the internationalist premises that have actually been welcomed by every other management since human being War II -- with the exception of Reagan"s first."

The Obsolescense of DeterrenceCharles Krauthammer responds to movie critics of the shrub preemption strategy. "To voluntarily choose as the rule on i beg your pardon to rest our security in this period of tools of mass damage is slim folly."

The High and the MightyHarvard"s Stanley Hoffmann analyzes what the calls America"s "new exceptionalism" in foreign policy.

We watch those tendencies in the current administration. They have actually historical root in American thinking about foreign policy, and American thinking around the country"s role in the world. Every one of this originates from the same well the American exceptionalism.

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Reporter, The Washington Post

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The nationwide Security Strategy is a file prepared for Congress to offer them one idea what direction the administration is heading, what kind of resources they will need and also how they watch the long-term objectives of America"s security policy.

This record talks a good deal around preemption and also the justification for preemption, military preemption, and also other kinds of preemption. It speak about, again, this nexus in between weapons of mass destruction and also international terrorism together being the main global threat the the an initial part that this century. Many civilization said as soon as the paper was released that it appeared to be a very elaborate justification for attacking Iraq, the if you start with the premise that you really desire to attack Iraq, girlfriend really want to remove Saddam Hussein, and then friend build roughly that a type of intellectual justification not just for that act yet to show how it fits into a lot larger, much much more well-thought-out strategy that might govern all kinds of policies in the future, then you have not only a doctrine, yet you have basically a strategy.

Since climate this totality kind the preemption thing has actually taken top top a life that its own and also has obtained them a many criticism. Who are you come say the you can preempt whatever assault you see coming, when and also from where, without having actually to give any evidence, without any proof that you"re acting in self-defense? and also the response has been, well, you know, if girlfriend look with the strategy document, girlfriend will view that we don"t say the it"s just military, us say, well sometimes we will operate through international financial structures. Sometimes we will use diplomacy, i beg your pardon is clear what they"re doing in north Korea.

Because the concern arises, here you have a regimen that we know has actually weapons of massive destruction, has already thrown inspectors out, has ballistic missiles, all of which Iraq doesn"t really have, and also Iraq has let the examiners in. So exactly how come you desire to use diplomacy in phibìc Korea and you think you need military preemption with Iraq?

Well, if you read the paper carefully, girlfriend will see that we have numerous different devices that enable us to select many various routes. We"ve always had diplomatic tools, we"ve constantly had jae won tools. What"s brand-new about that document, ns think, is the preemptive military strategy, placing it down on record and saying, "We have the right and the responsibility to move against people that us perceive to it is in a risk to this country."

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Editor, The Weekly Standard

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It"s bigger than Iraq, and it"s bigger than the middle East. I mean, the world is a mess. And, i think, it"s really much to Bush"s credit transaction that he"s acquired serious around dealing through it. But, Iraq"s no going to be the end of it.

Obviously, there space exercises the American strength that can be unwise. But, on the greatest question, is the an excellent danger too tiny an exercise, too average an exercise of American power, or too great, as well forward leaning an practice of American power? i think that"s straightforward question to answer. The peril is American withdrawal, American timidity, American slowness. The danger is not that we"re going to execute too much. The peril is the we"re walking to perform too little.

I think when historians look at the last several decades, they"ll say there was the Cold War duration from the late 40s come 1989 or 1991. There to be the 90s, the te of peace and prosperity. And also then there"s currently the post-9/11 period; we"ll view what it it s okay called. Yet it is a brand-new moment. And Bush to trust it"s a brand-new moment. One have the right to imagine an unbelievably dangerous civilization five, 10, 15 years from now, or one have the right to imagine a much much more hopeful world. Yet an awful many it counts on what the U.S. Does, and how successful America is. And that, in turn, relies on what the Bush management does, and also how successful George W. Shrub is.

Now, it"s an extremely much come his credit that top top Sept. 11, very quickly after ~ Sept. 11, he pertained to that understanding. And I don"t think that was rather as inevitable as it currently seems that he would understand that this was the defining moment of his presidency, and perhaps that American background for the next 10 to 20 years. However he pertained to that conclusion very quickly.

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Reporter, The Washington Post

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I doubt there"s any government in the people that travel guide itself generally by strategy or theoretical documents or worldview. Anyone who has actually the reigns that power needs to look at useful limitations and also tradeoffs and also the truth that friend can focus at most on one or two things at a time, and also that resources are restricted and that there are disputes of interest, because that example, in between your trade objectives, your person rights objectives, her nuclear nonproliferation objectives, and the desire come make certain you"re the toughest son on the block in every an ar of the world.

And so I see a strong element of pragmatism and also realism that is in compete in the shrub White residence with the grand strategy the maintaining worldwide hegemony and the grand strategy of preempting the salvation or advance or use of certain classes of weapons by any kind of other state.

You saw it in the interception of a North oriental supply delivery on the means to Yemen through a load of missiles. If over there was any type of case study in which you"d expect to see the application of a shrub preemption doctrine -- and also let"s remember, this happened literally top top the day that this preemption doctrine is exit -- you"d have actually thought the American plan under this White home would have taken this missiles, one of two people seized lock or sunk them on the high seas and also said, "We"re not going to tolerate North oriental missile exports." and what perform they do? They get a very strong protest native Yemen, on which they space depending in another security interest entirely, which is the war with Al Qaeda, and they cave. They say, "Oh, forgive me, we didn"t establish it to be for you, here are your missiles."

So cool strategy can"t guide every decision and also certainly isn"t guiding every decision in the bush White House.

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Former State department official and Mideast envoy

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The 2002 is an effort to look at at nationwide security with a really broad set of brushstrokes. In effect, there"s an effort to look at nationwide security and look at some of the hazards that space not even traditional threats: to look in ~ health concerns like AIDS that can be a threat, to view that in a location like Africa the there has to be an approach to make the efforts to transform the fact there. This is something the you didn"t uncover at every in the 1992 document, due to the fact that it was a small DOD technique designed to shot to guess what were new kinds of army threats that the armed forces would have to plan against.

The national Security is comprehensive, in the sense that it incorporates that, but it tries to look much more broadly. The controversial aspects of it the unified States" need to be the sole power, the requirement as that strength to transaction in a different method than in the Cold battle world, the sometimes way preemption and such. Having said the there are real differences in between the 2 documents, there"s also a details continuity come them, as well.

In 1992, what was clear is that the Cold battle was over and also we had actually won it. We didn"t know specifically what the form of the brand-new world to be going to be, and this was an initiative to look at the nature of the threats, but we to be the predominant power. That was unmistakable then. So over there was an initiative to look at brand-new threats, but to look in ~ them with the lens that how could you use the strength that we had actually to address those, recognizing that we had no peer, no real competitor, as a power?

So that"s wherein I think several of the intellectual wellsprings the the 2002 record do emerge from, because 2002 is make it very clear, very explicit, that we will usage our strength to go after these objectives, come pursue goals that we think about to be essential for American interests, but for the world"s interests. In many respects, the personality of this document is in maintaining with what can be defined as America"s picture of exceptionalism: the we constantly use strength for good, the we have selfless purposes. This is the way we see ourselves. It"s not necessarily the method the rest of the world sees us.

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Former analyst, CIA and National protection Council

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Why is the a damaging notion

Saddam Hussein"s Iraq does attitude a threat to the an important interests of the unified States, and also of the whole world. And also that means that Iraq is, in some ways, a unique threat the does need an extraordinary response, a preemptive solution by the joined States and also its allies to avoid Saddam Hussein from ever before acquiring the weapons of massive destruction, in particular the nuclear tools that would make him perhaps an insurmountable threat.

But, because Iraq is a unique threat, it also method that Iraq need to not become the basis for a more comprehensive policy. And, in particular, this shouldn"t it is in a one-size-fits-all policy. What"s best for Iraq isn"t necessarily what"s right for the troubles that we have with Iran, or phibìc Korea, or Cuba, or Syria or Libya or any of these various other countries, with whom we carry out have really serious problems.

In countless cases, a battle would it is in the worst feasible solution for these countries. Going to war through North Korea right now could be horrific, because the U.S. Knowledge Committee appears to think that north Korea already possesses nuclear weapons. In various other cases, as in Iran, probably the last thing we want is to try to occupy a country of 70 million world in Iran, a country four times the dimension of Iraq.

By the same token, though, ns think that the Bush administration is in reality hurting its case for war with Iraq by pushing a strategy that preemption much more broadly. My own sense is the talking with Europeans and also our other allies, they are often an extremely deeply concerned around a war v Iraq, not since of the specifics of the Iraqi circumstance, but since they"re fear of setup a precedent. They"re afraid that this will come to be the very first of numerous preemptive wars dealt with by the joined States. And I think the the administration could more than likely do a much far better job in building support for a war through Iraq, if they did do the case that Iraq is, in fact, a unique threat which calls for a unique an answer and that us aren"t planning on mounting preemptive wars against any the a series of other countries.

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Most of the countries around the civilization recognize that Saddam Hussein"s regime is just one of the most odious that the critical 100 years. They identify that this guy is a threat, the we"ve had to go to war through him when before and that ridding the people of this program would do the civilization a much much better place. But, they"re really nervous about giving the United claims carte blanche for a plan of preemption. And, i think, in many instances they"re do the efforts to litter the brakes on Iraq, and hope that this throw the brakes top top this larger policy.

 

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